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Argentine submarines in action IV: The ARA San Luis (S-32) and ARA Salta (S-31) during crisis in Chile in 1978

Argentine submarines IKL 209 of German origin who owned the Armada Argentina were of the South American art. SSK type (conventional attack submarine diesel-electric) the ARA Salta (S-31) and ARA San Luis (S-32) had been incorporated into active duty to just over three years. Despite this the high command sent to veterans "GUPPY" to patrol areas more "hot." Photo 1. The ARA Salta (S-31) getting to sea in Mar del Plata , the background of the south jetty (Source: http://www.ara.mil.ar/ )

The "Skip" and "San Luis" sailed from the Naval Base Mar del Plata (BNMP) on December 8, 1978 to the southern tip of the continent, starting his war patrols. All Argentine submarine commanders were ordered to "not attack unless attacked first was" , a measure somewhat strange to the world where divers are always looking Otherwise, this is "strike first and then sneak to avoid being attacked. "

The ARA San Luis (S-32) and a squad with less risk.

In

navigation immersion to the south, the ARA San Luis , commanded by Commander Felix Bartholomew, suffers the failure of one of their diesel engines. This reduced to 50% yield and recharge submarine batteries, and that shortly after joining the Navy one of the engines had broken and could not be repaired (the severity of the damage was such that had replace the motor or do a repair off the ship, requiring the cutting back of the helmet and welding). This new engine problem could not be solved by the mechanics of the crew despite strenuous efforts.

Photo 2. The "Skip" surf surface waters of the Beagle Channel to 1979 (Source: http://www.laperlaaustral.com.ar/ )

report the situation to the Naval Command, the change orders to patrol the area "San Luis" allocating a higher reserve and close to the national territory, the mouth is the Strait of Magellan , north of Isla Grande de Tierra del Fuego. The patrol declined submarine was completed without incident and then was ordered to go to meet the fishing "Aracena" (vessel requisitioned by the ARA and used this time as a nurse in the submarine) near Staten Island .

Map . Assigned to patrol areas "Skip" and "San Luis" in December 1978.

few days after the Papal mediation to avoid the war with Chile, the "San Luis" sets sail towards the BNMP , where he arrived on 16 January 1979, after 876 hours navigation and 6270 kilometers. Three years later, S-32 serve a risky war patrol facing the Royal Navy during the Falklands War .

The ARA Salta (S-31) and a dangerous encounter.

The ARA Salta (S-31) , commanded by Commander Eulogio Moya, went to his patrol area in the waters of Cape Horn . In his journey to the south, at the height of Staten Island, and recharge your batteries while submerged snorkel depth there is a curious fact, but it could have been tragic. A plane Grumman S-2E Tracker of Armada Argentina in ASW mission (ASW), detects their necks and making low flights began throwing sono buoys to try to find the unidentified submarine. The "Skip" , warned by their detection system quickly searches the depths of the sea and evades the location by the Tracker, which no doubt would have launched depth charges or torpedoes to be confused with the Chilean submarine as no information on the shipping lanes of the submarines themselves.

Photo 3. image of a Grumman S-2E Tracker , similar to that mentioned in this post, taken from the periscope of a submarine (Source: http://www.nuestromar.org/ )

After the fright, the "Skip" continued on their way immersion towards Cape Horn , an area where the violent waves made it difficult to recharge batteries by snorkel and where underwater currents caused the navigation was somewhat erratic. When sailing to snorkel depth antenna countermeasures "Skip" detecting the action of a radar monitored terrestrial Chilean naval movements in the area, but probably because of strong surf the Argentine submarine lost on the radar Chileans.

One day before D-Day , date of "Operation Sovereignty" including the landing and taking of the disputed islands (Lennox, Picton and Nueva), while the "Skip" stretching his snorkel to charge batteries, appeared before the eyes of the officer on duty that scanned the horizon, the silhouette of a submarine operating on the surface. To reach a spot in a clear form of two of its crew on the hull towards the bow.

The CF orders Eulogio Moya immediately suspending the operation of snorkel and gives directives to cover combat positions and gain greater depth. The torpedo tubes are made with MK-37 torpedoes, antisubmarine waiting for the eviction order. The surprise is total, since the detection enemy was the old fashioned way visually. Apparently the noise of the engines running while their batteries recharged impossible to sonar alert before its dangerous presence.

Photo 4. In a rough sea the bow of the ARA Salta is torn between the waves as it moves through the Beagle Channel (Source: http://www.mundohistoria.org/ )

Suddenly sonar commander warns that the Chilean submarine submerged depth and winning the tension increases the possibility of detecting the presence of "Skip" Chilean territorial waters. Despite being given all the conditions and calculations as to launch torpedoes the CF Eulogio Moya, decided to await the movements of the Chilean ship before acting, as he was ordered from the Naval Command. The nervousness is present in the crew when the sounding notes that hears rumors of a torpedo on approach. The "Jump" starts maneuvers evasive not to be reached and the sonar operator communicates, to the relief of all, the rumor is dissipated and disappeared.

Commander expectantly awaiting new information on the Chilean submarine position to make decisions, when bursting into the communications officer and reported that it has managed to decipher the message received while charging the battery, the planned naval operations are suspended for accepting the Papal mediation Argentine government. New orders for "Skip" are sent to the Staten Island and finding the fish (now the mother ship) "Aracena" .

Photo 5. The fishing Aracena that requisitioned by the Navy Argentina sometimes served the mother ship of Submarine Force in 1978 (Source: http://www.histarmar.com.ar/ )

The Chilean submarine, was undoubtedly the ARCH Simpson (SS-21) , only unit fully operational at the time. Commander "Simpson" in those crucial days Captain (R) Rubén Scheihing , flatly denies that contact had been maintained and strikingly Argentine submarines states that no investigations were carried launching torpedoes (submarine attacks available to the antiquated MK-27 "Cuties" already in the '60s were considered obsolete).

What happened then? If credit is given to the Chilean commander what was it that the sonar operator interpreted as the approach of a torpedo? Perhaps in a time of so much adrenaline, mistook the sound of water filling of the tubes themselves with MK-37 torpedoes who enlisted with the sound of a torpedo run. This would also explain the sudden fading later.

The truth is that, with the torpedo launch or not Chile, it was very close to an underwater confrontation that could have marked the beginning of an armed conflict consequences and costs (material and human) unpredictable.

Photo 6. Aerial view of Sail ARA Salta browsing area (Source: http://www.elsnorkel.com/ )

The ARA Salta (S-31) returned to the BNMP on January 16, 1979, along with his twin ARA San Luis (S-32) after a patrol that lasted 31 days (about 740 hours) and which traveled over 8,470 miles. During the Falklands War in 1982 the "Skip" see less action. Due to technical problems related to the issuance of rumors and unusual vibrations, entered dry dock and was out of the war patrols COFUERSUB . Despite this additional tasks performed by the superior ordered the end of May, but that's another story.

Story based on the following news stories:

"The Submarine Force Armada Argentina in the 1978 crisis" Author: Ricardo Burzaco / DEYSEG Magazine Issue 43 / Argentina (Published on the web by http://www.mgp-club.com/ )

"The Submarine Force of the Navy of Chile to the conflict in 1978" Author: Ivan Martinic / Diario El Mercurio / Chile (Published on the web by http://www.mgp-club.com/ )

multiple sources.

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Argentine Submarine Action III: The ARA San Luis (S-32) in the Falklands War

In late December 1981 assumes command of the submarine ARA San Luis (S-32) , the Commander Fernando Azcueta and is appointed the new crew. Four months later this inexperienced and rookie patrol manning break in war against the Royal Navy , an expert on antisubmarine warfare and its role in NATO .

The April 3, 1982 , a day after the "Operation Rosario" which enabled the recovery of the Malvinas Islands the CF Azcueta receive the Order of Commander of the Submarine Force ( COFUERSUB) to enlist the submarine as quickly as possible to sail to the South Atlantic. Made the preparations necessary, including the burden of food and water for a long time on patrol, the "San Luis" part of the Naval Base Mar del Plata (BNMP) the April 11. To carry out the campaign had been stocked with 10 SST-4 torpedoes fiber-optic guided anti-ship of German origin, and 14 MK-37 torpedoes submarine of U.S. origin, considered weapons of last generation.

Photo 1. Load torpedo tubes forward by a submarine 209 IKL Argentina (Source: www.histarmar.com.ar)

The April 19, an damage in the fire control computer VM8-24, which can not be repaired on board. This failure meant that the torpedo launches were done based on manual calculations, and one at a time and can not be done in "saving" two or three units as is typically done with computer systems. Communicated this development to the superiority is ordered to continue their patrol, as the British fleet of surface and was heading for the Falkland Islands (begin arriving in the area 3 days later) and assumed the presence in water southernmost of the feared nuclear submarines.

The "San Luis" enter on the morning of April 28 their patrol area, known as "Mary" , north of East Falkland in search of English ships, but only on day 29 , that following the events in South Georgia (recovery by the force of the British) , which is authorized to attack targets of opportunity potential. First

Navy torpedo launched by Argentina during a military conflict.

The May 1, the day that hostilities are initiated in the Theater of Operations Malvinas, the sound of "San Luis" detected hydrophonic rumor is identified as belonging a British destroyer, also detects deployment of helicopters in the area. The Commander Azcueta orders to head in contact with sonar and periscope depth set to confirm the assessment. The fog makes it impossible to visualize the target.

Photo 2. The Lieutenant Junior Maegli , Communications, holding the periscope, poses next to Commander Fernando Azcueta , Commander of "San Luis" (Source: www.nuestromar.org)

Given the chance of being discovered by the English, Azcueta making the decision to launch about contacting a fiber-optic guided SST-4 torpedo from a distance of 8,700 meters. Great was the disappointment when after two minutes of launch operator warned that the fiber-optic guided wire was cut, so that the torpedo continued its defeat without a guide but without reaching its target. The "San Luis" then began evasive maneuvers to avoid certain British reaction, did not wait long. Then the sound warning of a torpedo launched by British helicopters and the Commander ordered to gain depth and launch decoys (known as "Alka Seltzer" in the jargon of ARA) with the aim of diverting the trajectory of the projectile enemy. The decision seemed correct when the sonar reported that the torpedo approaching threatening towards the stern of "San Luis" changed course suddenly from long with uncertain destiny.

3D illustration. Artistic image that recreates the first launch of a SST-4 by the ARA San Luis (S-32) during the Falklands War (Author: Andrea Assanelli / Source: www.elsnorkel.com)

But the "hunt" against "San Luis" just beginning. Minutes later began to hear the roar of the depth charges released to blind enemy helicopters. The "hunters" were three helicopter antisubmarine warfare (ASW) Sea King of 826 Sqdn aircraft carrier HMS Hermes with the support of frigates HMS Brilliant and HMS Yarmouth tried in vain to find the whereabouts the S-32 , which at that point had landed in the deep seabed.

On that day, and according to British sources, the Sea King have thrown into the sea about six depth charges MK-11 torpedoes and two MK-46 Submarine without achieve better results. The shock waves far not reached the "San Luis" he waited in silence 5 long and agonizing hours before taking again its navigation. During this period the crew remained in their bunks and no activity seeking the greatest possible savings of oxygen.

Photo 3. The Lieutenant Ricardo Alessandrini, Chief of Armament, next to Lieutenant Junior Alejandro Maegli during war patrol in waters of Malvinas (Source: www.nuestromar.org)

New Contact sonar and second release

April 5 The into the night, will recognize a new rumor hydrophonic aft that sonar interpreted as a submarine on approach. The Commander ordered to occupy combat positions to address the sonar contact, which went sailing in a zigzag. When it was about 2,000 feet away Azcueta ordered the release of a submarine torpedo MK-37. Minutes later the crew heard a loud explosion but does not confirm the result or the target attacked. Many conjectures have been raised about that given the anti-submarine torpedo the "San Luis" , one suggested an impact on the Oberon Class submarine HMS Onyx who returned to Britain with the bow damaged (The Royal Navy attributed the fault to a crash against the rocks), another with an accurate shot from a whale or a school of krill because the rumor in sound and stress of the situation could be confused at the sound of the guard.

The third launch was not lucky

The May 11, near the mouth of the Strait of San Carlos , setting a new rumor in the sonar attributed this time to two ships frigate-type war. The Commander Azcueta ordered to attack the nearest target located about 7,300 meters from "San Luis" . Was assigned to the launch tube # 1, but the torpedo failed and did not leave. Immediately provided for a new release from tube # 8, but the distance to the frigate was shortened to only 4,700 meters. The SST-4 torpedo thrown out white but had just three minutes when travel was cut fiber-optic guided wire. Waiting, the crew waited in vain for the sound of a distant explosion.

When preparing to make a new release on another sonar contact, the frigate began to move away at full speed doing evasive maneuvers, so was aborted action.

Photo 4. IKL 209 submarine the Armada Argentina emerge at maximum power (Source: www.histarmar.com.ar)

Frustrated by the ineffectiveness of its weapons system, the commander informs the COFUERSUB , news of his unsuccessful attack and is ordered to return to the continent and to end their war patrol. Impotence

final rematch could not be

After 39 days of patrol , of \u200b\u200bwhich 36 became submerged (about 864 hours) the "San Luis" docked in Puerto Belgrano Naval Base , on May 19 at night. The crew bearded, exhausted and disappointed by the lack of success in the mission set out to break a new patrol car waiting to give him a chance to take revenge.

Photo 5. The Captain Moya received, late at night, the bearded and exhausted crew of the ARA San Luis which is on deck, new arrival at Puerto Belgrano after its war patrol (Source: www.nuestromar . org)

Meanwhile, the technicians start febrile tasks systems repair and damage suffered by the various "San Luis" during his journey in the South Atlantic . Also formed a technical committee to analyze the possible causes of the failures raised by the weapon system and the torpedoes themselves. The set-up tasks took longer than expected, and June 14, the day Argentina surrendered on the islands, he found the ARA San Luis still in dock.

Photo 6. The crew poses for the candle ARA San Luis after returning from war patrol (Source: www.nuestromar.org)

Despite being unable to do damage with their torpedoes, this little submarine and its crew, was able to circumvent the British blockade and filling of concern to the commanders of the British fleet. The Royal Navy , the armed wing of anti-submarine strategy of NATO , could never find him.

In recognition of services rendered to the country during the Falklands War , the flag of war ARA San Luis (S-32) was awarded the "Honor Courage in Combat" .

La Yapa: Why failed torpedo launches? What was done about it?

should first be noted that the fault in the computer fire control was a factor which partly explains the failure of the release. Technicians on board, with little experience in the submarine, they could not find a solution to this failure. For this reason the torpedoes had to throw in the old style or manually calculating and making estimates of trajectory needed to reach his target.

Photo 7. Fiber-optic guided SST-4 Torpedo to attack surface targets on display in the Museum Submarine Force Mar del Plata. The same is transparent sections In order to view the inner mechanics (Author: Mariano Agostini)

failures made by the fiber-optic guided SST-4 torpedoes of German origin, is apparently explained by assembly error that affected the polarity of the connectors on the gyro. It also mentions that the manufacturer AEG-Telefunken found flaws in the design of the SST-4 for the export market and improved on them to remedy the late '70s, but they were not implemented in the torpedo delivered to the Navy Argentina for budgetary reasons.

also by Navy budget constraints had never tried SST-4 torpedoes real, but only some of the year, without explosive charge. In tests carried out in late 1981 (the year before the war) even these failed, managing to complete the planned trajectory and walked one.

In 1983 technical and German Navy sent by AEG Telefunken review the fire control system and torpedoes, making the changes needed to build reliability submarine weapons system Class 209 / torpedo SST -4.

subsequently performed several tests and exercises the most important being developed by the ARA Salta (S-31) , the October 31, 2001 , launching a torpedo SST-4 modified on disused fishing "South Pole" used as a target ship.

Photo 8. An SST-4 launched from the ARA Salta (S-31), IKL 209 Class submarine , full impact on the fishing North Pole in 2001 . Image captured from the periscope.

Previously, June 15, 1987 the submarine Class TR 1700, ARA Santa Cruz (S-41) had conducted a successful launch of a SST-4 improved on destructor (radius of service 3 years ago and used as a target) ARA Py (D-27) . The impact was an explosion that lifted the ship at the middle about 5 feet, literally splitting it in two, just 5 minutes sank disappearing from the sea surface.

Photo 9. Explosion caused by the impact of a SST-4 torpedo on the destroyer ARA Py launched in a test conducted by the ARA Santa Cruz (S-41) in 1987.

While speculations with the fait accompli of no use, one wonders (see further testing with improved SST-4), which would have happened if the weapons system had been in optimum operating conditions.

Sources:

- "Voyage to the Bottom of the South Seas" by Jorge Fernández Díaz. NATION Journal Saturday, August 22, 2009 (www.histarmar.com.ar / www.elsnorkel.com)
- "One against all" by Jorge R. Vault (www.irizar.org)
- "Falklands Air War" by Rodney et al. Argentina Open Editions, 1988.
- other groups.