In late December 1981 assumes command of the submarine ARA San Luis (S-32) , the Commander Fernando Azcueta and is appointed the new crew. Four months later this inexperienced and rookie patrol manning break in war against the Royal Navy , an expert on antisubmarine warfare and its role in NATO .
The April 3, 1982 , a day after the "Operation Rosario" which enabled the recovery of the Malvinas Islands the CF Azcueta receive the Order of Commander of the Submarine Force ( COFUERSUB) to enlist the submarine as quickly as possible to sail to the South Atlantic. Made the preparations necessary, including the burden of food and water for a long time on patrol, the "San Luis" part of the Naval Base Mar del Plata (BNMP) the April 11. To carry out the campaign had been stocked with 10 SST-4 torpedoes fiber-optic guided anti-ship of German origin, and 14 MK-37 torpedoes submarine of U.S. origin, considered weapons of last generation.
Photo 1. Load torpedo tubes forward by a submarine 209 IKL Argentina (Source: www.histarmar.com.ar) The April 19, an damage in the fire control computer VM8-24, which can not be repaired on board. This failure meant that the torpedo launches were done based on manual calculations, and one at a time and can not be done in "saving" two or three units as is typically done with computer systems. Communicated this development to the superiority is ordered to continue their patrol, as the British fleet of surface and was heading for the Falkland Islands (begin arriving in the area 3 days later) and assumed the presence in water southernmost of the feared nuclear submarines.
The "San Luis" enter on the morning of April 28 their patrol area, known as "Mary" , north of East Falkland in search of English ships, but only on day 29 , that following the events in South Georgia (recovery by the force of the British) , which is authorized to attack targets of opportunity potential. First
Navy torpedo launched by Argentina during a military conflict.
The May 1, the day that hostilities are initiated in the Theater of Operations Malvinas, the sound of "San Luis" detected hydrophonic rumor is identified as belonging a British destroyer, also detects deployment of helicopters in the area. The Commander Azcueta orders to head in contact with sonar and periscope depth set to confirm the assessment. The fog makes it impossible to visualize the target.
Photo 2. The Lieutenant Junior Maegli , Communications, holding the periscope, poses next to Commander Fernando Azcueta , Commander of "San Luis" (Source: www.nuestromar.org) Given the chance of being discovered by the English, Azcueta making the decision to launch about contacting a fiber-optic guided SST-4 torpedo from a distance of 8,700 meters. Great was the disappointment when after two minutes of launch operator warned that the fiber-optic guided wire was cut, so that the torpedo continued its defeat without a guide but without reaching its target. The "San Luis" then began evasive maneuvers to avoid certain British reaction, did not wait long. Then the sound warning of a torpedo launched by British helicopters and the Commander ordered to gain depth and launch decoys (known as "Alka Seltzer" in the jargon of ARA) with the aim of diverting the trajectory of the projectile enemy. The decision seemed correct when the sonar reported that the torpedo approaching threatening towards the stern of "San Luis" changed course suddenly from long with uncertain destiny.
3D illustration. Artistic image that recreates the first launch of a SST-4 by the ARA San Luis (S-32) during the Falklands War (Author: Andrea Assanelli / Source: www.elsnorkel.com) But the "hunt" against "San Luis" just beginning. Minutes later began to hear the roar of the depth charges released to blind enemy helicopters. The "hunters" were three helicopter antisubmarine warfare (ASW) Sea King of 826 Sqdn aircraft carrier HMS Hermes with the support of frigates HMS Brilliant and HMS Yarmouth tried in vain to find the whereabouts the S-32 , which at that point had landed in the deep seabed.
On that day, and according to British sources, the Sea King have thrown into the sea about six depth charges MK-11 torpedoes and two MK-46 Submarine without achieve better results. The shock waves far not reached the "San Luis" he waited in silence 5 long and agonizing hours before taking again its navigation. During this period the crew remained in their bunks and no activity seeking the greatest possible savings of oxygen.
Photo 3. The Lieutenant Ricardo Alessandrini, Chief of Armament, next to Lieutenant Junior Alejandro Maegli during war patrol in waters of Malvinas (Source: www.nuestromar.org) New Contact sonar and second release
April 5 The into the night, will recognize a new rumor hydrophonic aft that sonar interpreted as a submarine on approach. The Commander ordered to occupy combat positions to address the sonar contact, which went sailing in a zigzag. When it was about 2,000 feet away Azcueta ordered the release of a submarine torpedo MK-37. Minutes later the crew heard a loud explosion but does not confirm the result or the target attacked. Many conjectures have been raised about that given the anti-submarine torpedo the "San Luis" , one suggested an impact on the Oberon Class submarine HMS Onyx who returned to Britain with the bow damaged (The Royal Navy attributed the fault to a crash against the rocks), another with an accurate shot from a whale or a school of krill because the rumor in sound and stress of the situation could be confused at the sound of the guard.
The third launch was not lucky
The May 11, near the mouth of the Strait of San Carlos , setting a new rumor in the sonar attributed this time to two ships frigate-type war. The Commander Azcueta ordered to attack the nearest target located about 7,300 meters from "San Luis" . Was assigned to the launch tube # 1, but the torpedo failed and did not leave. Immediately provided for a new release from tube # 8, but the distance to the frigate was shortened to only 4,700 meters. The SST-4 torpedo thrown out white but had just three minutes when travel was cut fiber-optic guided wire. Waiting, the crew waited in vain for the sound of a distant explosion.
When preparing to make a new release on another sonar contact, the frigate began to move away at full speed doing evasive maneuvers, so was aborted action.
Photo 4. IKL 209 submarine the Armada Argentina emerge at maximum power (Source: www.histarmar.com.ar) Frustrated by the ineffectiveness of its weapons system, the commander informs the COFUERSUB , news of his unsuccessful attack and is ordered to return to the continent and to end their war patrol. Impotence
final rematch could not be
After 39 days of patrol , of \u200b\u200bwhich 36 became submerged (about 864 hours) the "San Luis" docked in Puerto Belgrano Naval Base , on May 19 at night. The crew bearded, exhausted and disappointed by the lack of success in the mission set out to break a new patrol car waiting to give him a chance to take revenge.
Photo 5. The Captain Moya received, late at night, the bearded and exhausted crew of the ARA San Luis which is on deck, new arrival at Puerto Belgrano after its war patrol (Source: www.nuestromar . org) Meanwhile, the technicians start febrile tasks systems repair and damage suffered by the various "San Luis" during his journey in the South Atlantic . Also formed a technical committee to analyze the possible causes of the failures raised by the weapon system and the torpedoes themselves. The set-up tasks took longer than expected, and June 14, the day Argentina surrendered on the islands, he found the ARA San Luis still in dock.
Photo 6. The crew poses for the candle ARA San Luis after returning from war patrol (Source: www.nuestromar.org) Despite being unable to do damage with their torpedoes, this little submarine and its crew, was able to circumvent the British blockade and filling of concern to the commanders of the British fleet. The Royal Navy , the armed wing of anti-submarine strategy of NATO , could never find him.
In recognition of services rendered to the country during the Falklands War , the flag of war ARA San Luis (S-32) was awarded the "Honor Courage in Combat" .
La Yapa: Why failed torpedo launches? What was done about it?
should first be noted that the fault in the computer fire control was a factor which partly explains the failure of the release. Technicians on board, with little experience in the submarine, they could not find a solution to this failure. For this reason the torpedoes had to throw in the old style or manually calculating and making estimates of trajectory needed to reach his target.
Photo 7. Fiber-optic guided SST-4 Torpedo to attack surface targets on display in the Museum Submarine Force Mar del Plata. The same is transparent sections In order to view the inner mechanics (Author: Mariano Agostini) failures made by the fiber-optic guided SST-4 torpedoes of German origin, is apparently explained by assembly error that affected the polarity of the connectors on the gyro. It also mentions that the manufacturer AEG-Telefunken found flaws in the design of the SST-4 for the export market and improved on them to remedy the late '70s, but they were not implemented in the torpedo delivered to the Navy Argentina for budgetary reasons.
also by Navy budget constraints had never tried SST-4 torpedoes real, but only some of the year, without explosive charge. In tests carried out in late 1981 (the year before the war) even these failed, managing to complete the planned trajectory and walked one.
In 1983 technical and German Navy sent by AEG Telefunken review the fire control system and torpedoes, making the changes needed to build reliability submarine weapons system Class 209 / torpedo SST -4.
subsequently performed several tests and exercises the most important being developed by the ARA Salta (S-31) , the October 31, 2001 , launching a torpedo SST-4 modified on disused fishing "South Pole" used as a target ship.
Photo 8. An SST-4 launched from the ARA Salta (S-31), IKL 209 Class submarine , full impact on the fishing North Pole in 2001 . Image captured from the periscope. Previously, June 15, 1987 the submarine Class TR 1700, ARA Santa Cruz (S-41) had conducted a successful launch of a SST-4 improved on destructor (radius of service 3 years ago and used as a target) ARA Py (D-27) . The impact was an explosion that lifted the ship at the middle about 5 feet, literally splitting it in two, just 5 minutes sank disappearing from the sea surface.
Photo 9. Explosion caused by the impact of a SST-4 torpedo on the destroyer ARA Py launched in a test conducted by the ARA Santa Cruz (S-41) in 1987. While speculations with the fait accompli of no use, one wonders (see further testing with improved SST-4), which would have happened if the weapons system had been in optimum operating conditions.
Sources:
- "Voyage to the Bottom of the South Seas" by Jorge Fernández Díaz. NATION Journal Saturday, August 22, 2009 (www.histarmar.com.ar / www.elsnorkel.com)
- "One against all" by Jorge R. Vault (www.irizar.org)
- "Falklands Air War" by Rodney et al. Argentina Open Editions, 1988.
- other groups.
0 comments:
Post a Comment