early May 1977 the Queen Elizabeth II of England, failure to award the Chile sovereignty over the Islands Picton, Lennox and New more adjacent islets, which were in dispute with Argentina (see map 1). Argentina's military junta rejects the arbitration decision and began a diplomatic conflict with Chile, which foresee the imminent outcome of a war. Both countries are preparing for war, and begin febrile trainings especially in the Armed due to the geographical characteristics of the disputed area. The Armed Forces of Argentina planned for late 1978 the "Operation Sovereignty" in order to invade Chile for several steps and landed on islands in the Beagle Channel effective in Chilean possession. A great storm that delayed the Argentine invasion plans, and mediation of Pope John Paul II the December 22, 1978, finally avoided the hostile climate that exists resulting in an Argentine-Chilean war whose outcome is uncertain and unpredictable consequences .
Map 1. Inside the blue circle the disputed islands Picton, Lennox and New . The Argentine claim of sovereignty over going through the same and that the maritime boundary between Argentina and Chile is located between the islands and the Chilean Navarino.
As part of the business plan December 8, 1978 depart from the Puerto Belgrano Naval Base (BNPB) due to the theater four (4) submarines at its disposal in Back then the Navy Argentina , veterans GUPPY: ARA Santa Fe (S-21) and ARA Santiago del Estero (S-22) and the most modern IKL-209 of German origin: ARA Salta (S-31) and ARA San Luis (S-32).
the other side of the Andes, in the South Pacific, the Chilean Navy also made their preparations. Its submarine force that "on paper" balanced that of Argentine opponent was at a disadvantage. consisted of four (4) units: two (2) submersible Balao class (without the modernization of the Argentine GUPPY, only the candle redesigned fiberglass) and two (2) modern Oberon class submarines British.
Photo 1. The three Chilean submarines on active duty in 1978. Oberon Modern British home "Hyatt" and "O'Brien" with characteristic dome in the bow, and the old submersible Balao class of American origin, "Simpson" . Note as a curiosity in the latter, which aft of the sail, there is still mounting 127mm cannon (Source: nuestromar.org)
The Balao were the ARCH Thomson (SS-20) ,-ex USS Spot SS-413-ARCH and Simpson (SS-21) -ex USS Springer SS-414-, Oberon new (built in 1977) the ARCH O'Brien (SS-22) and ARCH Hyatt (SS-23) . But parity would not be such as in December 1978, at the time of increased tension with Argentina, because only the "Simpson" was operating . The "Thomson" was in "active reserve" (all an understatement as it was not in working condition), the "O'Brien" was in dry dock for maintenance and "Hyatt" with damaged engine was stuck in Talcahuano. "One against all ", when Simpson played a difficult task if you do not have diplomatic conflict resolution, to attack the fleet landing Argentina trying to inflict as much damage as possible, and hopefully survive to tell.
The ARA Santa Fe (S-21) in action
commander "Santa Fe" , Commander Alberto Manfrino was ordered, as the commanders of the other submarines from Argentina, fire their torpedoes only if attacked in a hearing before the Navy of Chile, and went to war patrol area in the Cook Bay, located between Chilean islands Hoste, Gordon and Londonderry (see map 2) , northwest of Cape Horn . Its strategic importance was given to be the natural access to Beagle Channel from the west and the transitional phase of the Chilean squadron should go to Cape Horn with final destination the Atlantic Ocean.
Map 2. The red circles indicate the areas of patrol GUPPY Argentina: Cook Bay assigned to the ARA Santa Fe and southwest of it entrusted to the ARA Santiago del Estero .
Choosing your patrol area seemed fully justified, when in mid-December, detected with sonar hydrophone rumors of warships, which came to exceed a dozen. No doubt it was the Chilean fleet becoming the sea, so that the "Santa Fe" rang zafarrancho combat, each crew member took his position and began preparations to launch the torpedo room. The captain and his crew, provided orders "not to attack unless attacked first was" remained in absolute silence as the craft passed over his submarine Chilean undetected (apparently the Chilean fleet sailed without active sonar detection avoid Early detection remote Argentine ships, but received the enemy submarine presence so close and dangerous)
Photo 2. The Chilean naval squadron advances with its camouflage ships and training. Perhaps a similar picture appeared in the mind of sonar ARA Santa Fe by detecting sonar contacts (Source: nuestromar.org)
Once past the moments of tension and away the Chilean fleet, the commander set a new direction to a more secure transmission through the news media keys patrol their superiors.
Photo 3. The ARA Santa Fe (S-21) immersion left hovering over the sea surface their masts. From left to right: 1 periscope fairing RWR antenna AT-222, 2 º periscope VLF communications mast, AN/BLR-1, snorkel and satellite navigation light and AS-1198 AS-1287 (Source: www.harpoondatabase . com)
With the mission accomplished, he received orders to proceed to Staten Island, where he was to meet his makeshift mother ship, the vessel "Arancena" , requisitioned by the Navy Argentina, at that time was already supplying the submarine ARA San Luis .
The campaign ARA Santa Fe during the crisis lasted 33 days (from 8/12/1978 to 1/10/1979) during which sailed nautical 3955 miles (about 7324km). Four years later, in 1982, the "Santa Fe" actively involved in the Falklands campaign .
The ARA Santiago del Estero (S-22) in action
The patrol area assigned to "Santiago de Estero" was southeast of Cook Bay, near waters Cape Horn, south of where it was his patrol the "Santa Fe". In these difficult and stormy waters was not easy navigation of these venerable submarine, but the stoicism and professionalism of the crew did that everything went according to plan.
Photo 4. The ARA Santiago del Estero in Naval Base Mar del Plata (BNMP) . (Source: www.wikipedia.org)
One day during a war patrol sonar "Santiago del Estero" detected the presence of a vessel, probably enemy. In order to proceed to their identification, Commander, Commander Carlos Sala, orders emerge to periscope depth. In their eyes appears the silhouette of a submarine sailing on the surface immediately recognized as one of the "Balao" of the Chilean Navy . The crew take their battle stations and ready the MK-37 torpedoes submarine in their tubes in the bow. As the submersible Chilean assumes no hostility or escape and immersion (data to realize they had not noticed the presence of Santiago del Estero), the commander decides to continue with the cautious observation and even manages to get a picture of "Simpson" before leaving the area quietly.
Photo 5. This image corresponds to the photograph obtained through the periscope by ARA Santiago del Estero of ARCH Simpson browsing surface to recharge batteries. Note that although there is the small towfish WFA mid bow Balao characteristic of Chileans will not be seen aft of the sail the 127mm gun, which might have been removed for that year (Source: nuestromar. org)
Sailing in Chilean waterproof surface is explained by their age, since in the absence of snorkeling, I was forced to surface to recharge their batteries. The Captain Rubén de Navio Scheihing , commander of the Chilean submersible "Simpson" during those days, anyway denies that there has been some contact with Argentine submarines in the nearly 70 patrol, despite the evidence of the photo you belie.
After communicating the news to the Command Commander Carlos Sala receives orders to retreat to Staten Island . In its war patrol, the ARA Santiago del Estero , sailed 4012 miles nautical (7430 km) along 36 exhausting days (from 8/12/1978 to 01/13/1979).
In conclusion
While failed to engage in combat, both the Argentine submarine veterans and their trained crews, were able to rise to the occasion and fulfill the missions entrusted by the superior. In adverse weather and difficult sea fed by the patrol assigned areas, working with media and somewhat outdated, and in complete isolation managed to make contact with the Chilean Navy ships and remain under cover without being detected.
Commanders also knew how to interpret the orders received and were very scrupulous before making decisions, not carried away by the excitement and adrenaline surely it feels to be so close to launching the first torpedo in actual combat, a decision would certainly have been the kickoff of a conflict between Argentina and Chile.
a bonus: arming the submarines involved
The Chilean submersible "Simpson" testify by their commander at the time, had only former MK-14 torpedoes (anti-surface, propulsion turbine - thus leaving the telltale wake-classical, straight line and detonated by contact) and MK-27 (anti-submarine, self-guided acoustic detonation by contact). In some images period is to "Simpson" preserving an ancient 127mm cannon located aft of the sail, no utility in a modern war, but apparently may be removed by 1978.
Photo 6. A MK-14 torpedo "DUMMY" used by our Navy for training in maneuvers, which is exhibited in the courtyard of the Museum Submarine Force located in Mar del Plata (Source: www . historiadelbuceo.com.ar) Argentine submarines "Santa Fe" and " Santiago del Estero " also available for anti-surface attack of unreliable MK-14 designed in the late 30's and is heavily used in World War 2, but possessed the advantage of anti-submarine torpedoes MK-37 fiber-optic guided and developed the most reliable in the 50s.
Story based on the following news stories:
"The Submarine Force Armada Argentina in the 1978 crisis"
Author: Ricardo Burzaco / DEYSEG Magazine Issue 43 / Argentina
(Posted on the website by http: / / www.mgp-club.com)
"The Submarine Force Navy of Chile to the conflict in 1978 "
Author: Ivan Martinic / Diario El Mercurio / Chile
(Published on the web by http://www.mgp-club.com)
Other sources.
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